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a b s t r a c t
A manufacturer who offers secret contracts faces an opportunism problem: She undercuts her own
input prices and fails to offset retail competition. I show that this problem diminishes when retailers
are risk averse and face demand uncertainty. Risk aversion and uncertainty create a bilateral risk
sharing incentive that raises equilibrium input prices above marginal cost. The manufacturer can
therefore profit from downstream risk aversion when retail competition is fierce.
© 2020 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
To achieve vertical control, manufacturers must restrict output
to offset retail competition. A fundamental idea in the vertical
restraints literature is that an upstream monopolist can do this
by charging per-unit input prices above the marginal cost of
production and extract remaining downstream rents by fixed
fees (Mathewson and Winter, 1984). This strategy is attractively
simple and well within antitrust laws in both the US and the EU.
Not surprisingly though, it fails under imperfect information.1
For one, the manufacturer cannot commit to these input prices
when retailers are unable to observe each other’s offers; i.e., when
contracts are secret. Instead, an opportunism problem arises: The
manufacturer cuts the price to one retailer to free ride on the
rents of rival retailers, then cuts the price to a second retailer and
so forth until all prices equal marginal cost (Hart and Tirole, 1990;
O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994). Thus,
when contracts shift from observable to secret, the market out-
come shifts from one extreme, monopoly, to another, unfettered
competition.2
Another strand of the literature abstracts from the issue of se-
cret contracting and emphasizes instead a different informational
E-mail address: teis.lomo@uib.no.
1 The strategy may also fail if retailers can exert sales effort, see Mathewson
and Winter (1984).
2 There is a strong analogy between this opportunism problem and the Coase-
conjecture for durable goods monopoly. Coase’s (1972) monopolist, who cannot
commit to prices over time, sells at cost from the first period onwards and loses
all market power. The manufacturer who cannot commit to contracts across
retailers sells at cost to all buyers and retains no vertical control.
friction, namely demand uncertainty. Although the friction is dif-
ferent the conclusion is similar: uncertainty is a problem because
it prevents vertical control. In particular, problems arise when
retailers are risk averse because the manufacturer must engage
in risk sharing to provide insurance against unfavorable market
conditions. As shown by Rey and Tirole (1986), this involves
designing contracts in a way that distorts pricing incentives and
leaves rents for the retailers.3
In many real-world markets, we see a combination of the
above-mentioned issues:
• Vertical supply contracting. A manufacturer offers a new and
original product but retailers may behave as risk averse;
e.g., due to liquidity constraints or by ‘‘inheriting’’ risk aver-
sion from their owners (Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani, 2006).
Supply contracts are typically proprietary information.
• Franchising. McDonald’s, 7-Eleven, H&R Block, etc., use the
franchise model. A franchisee is often a person with ‘‘skin
in the game’’ (Fan et al., 2017) who cannot inspect the con-
tracts of rival franchisees nor foresee how many customers
she will attract or which products and services they will
purchase.
• Technology licensing. An innovator (upstream party) pitches
a new technology to a risk averse firm (e.g., as in Bousquet
et al., 1998). Unless the innovator can commit to an exclu-
sive contract the firm may reasonably worry that also her
rivals will obtain the technology, and at lower royalty rates
as well.
3 In addition, retail risk aversion may cause vertical foreclosure (Hansen and
Motta, 2020).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109114
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Despite the many examples, I am not aware of any study of an
upstream firm’s contracting problem in a setting with risk aver-
sion, uncertainty, and secret contracts. In this paper, I examine
exactly such a model in which one manufacturer offers secret
two-part tariffs to several risk averse retailers while consumers’
taste for the product is unknown.4 The analysis contributes to
the literature on secret contracting by showing that the presence
of retail risk aversion leads to input prices above marginal cost
that depend on the risk aversion level and demand curvature
in intuitive ways. The model delivers testable predictions and a
better understanding of the trade-off between risk sharing and
rent extraction. An interesting corollary is that when downstream
competition is sufficiently fierce, the manufacturer can actually
profit from the retailers’ risk aversion because the incentive for
risk sharing mitigates the opportunism problem.
2. Model
There is one manufacturer, M , and n ≥ 2 retailers. (I use
feminine pronouns for all firms.) N is the set of retailers. M has
constant marginal cost of production, c ≥ 0. I normalize all
other costs to zero. There are two stages. In the first stage, M
makes take-it-or-leave-it contract offers to the retailers. Contract
offers are secret, and retailers never observe each other’s terms
throughout the game. The offer to retailer i ∈ N is a two-part
tariff, Ti (qi) = Fi + wiqi, with fixed fee Fi, input price wi, and
quantity qi. Each retailer then accepts or rejects her offer. In the
second stage, retailers with accepted offers place their orders, pay
the tariffs, and compete à la Cournot in the final market.





tures the ‘‘taste’’ for M ’s product among final consumers. The
value of θ is unknown throughout the first stage. At the beginning
of the second stage, nature picks θ upon which it becomes observ-
able to all active firms. This timing, which I borrow from Rey and
Tirole (1986), implies that retailers are unable to predict perfectly
their revenues from reselling M ’s product when considering her
supply terms.
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
given the passive beliefs refinement. With passive beliefs, a re-
tailer does not update her beliefs about the rivals’ offers in the
event that she receives an unexpected (i.e., out-of-equilibrium)
offer.5 I focus on symmetric equilibria.
The inverse demand faced by retailer i is Pi (qi, q−i, θ), where
q−i is the vector of quantities of all other retailers. Inverse de-
mand functions are symmetric. For any θ and n-dimensional
vector of input prices, I assume that the downstream Cournot
game has a stable, unique, and interior equilibrium. Finally, I
assume that the function Pi is thrice continuously differentiable

























Starting left, I call the first condition A1, etc. Then, A1 says
that consumers see retailers as substitutes; A2 implies that retail
4 Abstracting from second-order differences, the model can be seen either
as Rey and Tirole (1986) with secret contracts or, equivalently, McAfee and
Schwartz (1994) with risk aversion and uncertainty.
5 Passive beliefs is the standard assumption in the secret contracts literature
(e.g., McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; Aghadadashli et al., 2016). These beliefs
are similar in spirit to the market-by-market conjectures in Hart and Tirole
(1990) and the contract equilibrium in O’Brien and Shaffer (1992). Note also
that passive beliefs coincide with so-called wary beliefs under retail Cournot
competition (Rey and Vergé, 2004). Thus, my main result holds also with wary
beliefs.
marginal revenue functions are decreasing in qi; A3 says that, all
else equal, a retailer can charge a higher price if consumers are
more receptive to M ’s product; A4 implies that retail marginal
revenue functions are increasing in θ ; and A5 ensures that M ’s
second order condition holds.
Finally, let u (πi) be the utility that retailer i derives from
earning a profit of πi = [Pi (qi, q−i, θ) − wi] qi−Fi. Here, u is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with u (0) = 0, u′ > 0,
and u′′ < 0: the retailers are risk averse. M is risk neutral.
3. Analysis
3.1. Deriving the main result
At the second stage, retailer i sets qi to maximize her profit
given the observed state θ . The first order condition equates




∂Pi (qi, q−i, θ)
∂qi
qi + Pi (qi, q−i, θ) = wi. (1)
In equilibrium, (1) holds ∀i. Let qi (wi,w−i, θ) be retailer i’s equi-
librium quantity where w−i is the vector of all other retailers’
input prices, and let
π̃i (wi,w−i, θ) ≡ [Pi (qi (wi,w−i, θ) , q−i (w−i, wi, θ) , θ) − wi]
× qi (wi,w−i, θ)
be her flow profit as a function of θ and input prices.
Consider now M ’s choice of input prices and fixed fees at the
first stage. To derive M ’s objective function, note first that, with
passive beliefs, each retailer anticipates that her rivals face the
(symmetric) equilibrium input price w∗. Setting w−i = w∗, M ’s












where E [.] is the expectation operator for θ . Furthermore, re-
tailers will accept their offers if and only if the proposed terms
promise a nonnegative expected utility. This gives the following











≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N.




















where in which λi is the multiplier for retailer i’s participation
constraint. M maximizes LM with respect to Fi and wi, ∀i ∈
N . Hereafter, I drop all functional arguments to simplify the































where q∗i is short for retailer i’s equilibrium quantity.
To proceed, let us note two things about (3). First, inside
the brackets after u′ we have in parentheses the derivative of
retailer i’s profit with respect to qi. By (1), this equals zero in
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equilibrium. By the envelope theorem, therefore, only the direct
effect ∂πi/∂wi = −qi remains. Second, after the input margin
(wi − c) we have the term dq∗i /dwi, which is the pass-through
rate of retailer i’s input price to her equilibrium quantity. We can
get an explicit formula for this pass-through rate by evaluating (1)
at the equilibrium quantities (when w−i = w∗), differentiating
with respect to wi, and then solving for dq∗i /dwi. This yields
the following (expected value of the) pass-through rate, which











where the sign follows from A2. These observations allow us to
rewrite (3) as










By substituting (5) into (4), we obtain


























(wi − c) ρi = Cov(u′, qi),
where the last equivalence uses the definition of covariance
which applies because u′ and qi are random variables at the first
stage. Importantly, we have Cov(u′, qi) < 0 for a risk averse
retailer: A change in θ that raises qi will, under A3 and A4, also









such that the first order condition for wi can be rewritten one
more time as
(wi − c) ρi = µi. (6)
It is easy to verify that M ’s second order condition holds.6 In a
symmetric equilibrium with wi = w∗, ∀i, we have ρi = ρ and
µi = µ, ∀i, because inverse demand and utility functions are
symmetric. By solving (6), we get the main result:
Proposition 1. In the symmetric PBE with passive beliefs, M sets
the input price to each retailer above marginal cost:




On the one hand, the manufacturer behaves opportunistically
because she sees her relationship with each retailer in isolation,
and thereby neglects the multilateral nature of her contracting
problem and the need to internalize competition between chan-
nels. In the terminology of Segal (1999), this is a contracting
6 The second order condition holds if and only if LM is concave. First, it can
be shown that (wi − c) qi is concave if and only if























which holds by A5 as long as wi ≥ c . Second, the term −λi [u (.)] is concave
because u′′ < 0 if and only if λi < 0 which follows from (5). Thus, LM is concave.
externality which exerts downward pressure on input prices.
On the other hand, the manufacturer finds it bilaterally optimal
to raise each retailer’s input price (and lower the fixed fee) to
reduce the variance of retail flow profits and thereby provide
insurance against the event that consumers dislike the product.
This creates a vertical externality akin to double marginalization
which counteracts the contracting externality by exerting upward
pressure on input prices. In equilibrium, the manufacturer sets
an input price that balances the two incentives.7 Risk sharing is
therefore a novel explanation for why secret contracting need not
cause marginal cost pricing.8
The equilibrium input price, w∗, rises with the retailers’ risk
aversion level. This follows because the absolute value of µ in-
creases with the risk aversion level, that is with the degree
of concavity of u (see Asplund, 2002). Intuitively, a more risk
averse retailer places more weight on low demand states and the
risk of monetary losses when considering M ’s offer. To provide
such a retailer with better insurance, M should raise the input
price. Consequently, (higher levels of) retail risk aversion also
unambiguously reduces output and consumer surplus in this
model.
Moreover, w∗ falls in the absolute value of ρ, that is in the
‘‘strength’’ of pass-through. Stronger pass-through means that M
faces a more elastic derived demand curve, which, all else equal,
calls for a price cut. Pass-through, in turn, depends on demand
curvature. For instance, consider the case in which consumers see
retailers as perfect substitutes. The market-wide inverse demand
is P (Q , θ) with Q = q + (n − 1) q∗ for each retailer. This
yields ρ = 1/
[
P ′ (2 + ηκ)
]
< 0 where η ≡ P ′′Q/P ′ is the
curvature of P (Q , θ) and κ = 1/n is the retail sector’s conduct
parameter.9 Note that ηκ > −2 by A2. From (7) we get w∗ − c =
µP ′ (2 + ηκ) > 0 which, all else equal, is higher (lower) the more
concave (convex) is inverse demand.
3.2. Relationship to commitment solution
Another important question is how the price given by (7)
compares to the price that M would choose if she could in fact
commit to input prices because her contract offers were pub-
licly observable. With public contracts, we generally know that
upstream firms can seek vertical control by raising input prices
in accordance with the intensity of retail competition. When the
incentive for competition dampening coexists with the incentive
for risk sharing, M would therefore get an extra push to increase
her margins. Consequently, we should expect that a move from
public to secret contracts tends to reduce input prices and expand
output, just as in models without risk aversion and uncertainty
(e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994).
To illustrate this point, let us consider the following example
(inspired by Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2006)). Suppose that
inverse demand is Pi (qi,Q−i, θ) = a + θ − qi − bQ−i, ∀i ∈ N .
The parameter b ∈ [0, 1] measures consumers’ willingness to
substitute across retail outlets and Q−i = Σn−1k̸=i qk is the total
output of retailers k ̸= i. Let α ≡ a − c > 0 be the effective
market size. Suppose also that θ has mean 0 and variance σ 2 > 0
7 This result and the underlying intuition is robust. In particular, expressions
similar to (7) can be derived also if retailers compete in prices, if there are
idiosyncratic demand shocks or uncertainty about per-unit retailing costs, if
there is upstream competition, or if the manufacturer uses other (non-linear)
contracts. Proofs are available from the author upon request.
8 Also Pinopoulos (2019) finds that a manufacturer who offers secret con-
tracts sets input prices above cost. However, the result is perhaps less surprising
in his model as he restricts attention to inefficient linear contracts without fixed
fees.
9 See Adachi and Ebina (2014) and Gaudin (2016) for more on pass-through
in vertical relationships.
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and that retailers have mean–variance preferences over profits,
u (πi) = E [πi] − (r/2) Var [πi], where r ≥ 0 is the coefficient of
risk aversion. As is well known, such preferences can be obtained
from utility functions with constant absolute risk aversion and
normally distributed uncertainty. For clarity, I assume that the
product rσ 2 is not too large.10 Under these assumptions, M ’s
equilibrium margin with secret contracts (corresponding to (7))
is
w∗ − c =
αrσ 2
τ + rσ 2
, (8)
where τ ≡ 2 + (n − 1) b > 0. With public contracts, the
symmetric equilibrium11 price can instead be written as
w − c =
(αb/4) (n − 1) τ 2 + αrσ 2
(1/2) (1 + b (n − 1)) τ 2 + rσ 2
. (9)
In line with the above intuition, it is straightforward to verify
from (8) and (9) that the difference ∆w ≡ w − w∗ is strictly
positive for all n and b > 0 and zero when retailers serve
independent markets (b = 0). Relatedly, note that w∗ > c if and
only if rσ 2 > 0 whereas w > c even if rσ 2 = 0. Finally, it is
worth noting that retail substitutability has opposite effects on w
and w∗: Whereas w rises with b because M puts more weight on
relaxing competition, w∗ falls with b because retailers pay smaller
franchise fees and therefore require less insurance.
3.3. Upstream profits and downstream risk aversion
Proposition 1 has a striking managerial implication: A man-
ufacturer who offers secret contracts can raise her profit by
targeting risk averse retailers if downstream competition is fierce
enough (that is, assuming risk preferences can be inferred).
To see this in the general model, consider the case in which
retail outlets are perfect substitutes and suppose for a moment
that the retailers were risk neutral. In this case, M would sell
at marginal cost (as u′′ = µ = 0) and extract each retailer’s
(expected) flow profit by a fixed fee. She would therefore earn the
full industry profit, which coincides with the aggregate profits in
a Cournot oligopoly where all firms have constant marginal cost
c. Under A1, these profits vanish as n goes to infinity (see Amir,
2002). Against this benchmark, what would be the impact on M ’s
expected profit of making retailers slightly risk averse? There are
two opposing effects. On the one hand, input prices would rise
above cost which would raise the industry profit. On the other
hand, M could no longer extract this entire profit. Specifically, a
risk averse retailer requires a nonnegative certainty equivalent,
which equals her expected profit less a risk premium (which is
typically increasing in the risk aversion level). Thus, the fixed
fee can at most equal the retailer’s expected flow profit less the
risk premium. In other words, M gets a smaller slice of a larger
pie when retailers go from risk neutral to slightly risk averse.12
But when n becomes sufficiently large and the profit under risk
neutrality sufficiently small, the benefit of higher input prices
dominates and M prefers risk averse retailers.13
10 If rσ 2 is very large relative to b and n, then M may give insurance also
through negative fixed fees. She would then have to raise per-unit input prices
also for pure rent extraction purposes, which would muddle the interplay
between risk sharing and competition dampening that I want to emphasize.
11 The appropriate solution concept for the public offers game is subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
12 The same logic applies to any further increase in the risk aversion level as
long as the resulting input price is not ‘‘too high’’ in the sense that it induces
retailers to buy less than the industry-profit maximizing quantity.
13 An analogous argument implies that M could profit by making a product
whose base demand is uncertain instead of certain (for given expected demand)
or by creating more uncertainty (e.g., raising σ 2) about the demand for her
product.
This logic carries over to the case of differentiated retailers
in the above-mentioned example. By using (8), we find that M ’s
expected equilibrium profit with secret contracts is
E [πM ] =
(










τ + rσ 2
)2 ,
where dE [πM ] /dr > 0 whenever n > (1/b)
(
2 + b + rσ 2
)
. Note
that a higher (lower) value of b, indicating more (less) retail
substitutability, reduces (raises) the threshold number of retailers
above which M profits from downstream risk aversion.
3.4. Empirical implications
The model yields several empirical predictions. First, it is nat-
ural to think that small retailers may be more risk averse than
large retailers; e.g., because small retailers face tighter liquid-
ity constraints or because large retailers have more diversified
product portfolios. In that case, Proposition 1 suggests that small
retailers will pay higher input prices. Furthermore, the pricing
rule in Proposition 1 illustrates how the demand structure and
the retail pass-through rate can affect per-unit input prices even
when firms use non-linear vertical contracts.14
Finally, the model offers an explanation for the inverse empir-
ical relationship between product market risk and the incidence
of vertical integration (see Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). This re-
lationship is widely seen as a puzzle because a classic agency
model with a risk neutral principal and one risk averse agent
predicts that the principal should attain more vertical ownership
when outcomes become more uncertain. However, the evidence
is consistent with an alternative theory of vertical integration,
based on supplier opportunism. To see this, we can start from the
observation that vertical integration is a way for an upstream firm
to regain commitment power and raise profits (Hart and Tirole,
1990). In my model, however, upstream profits may be positively
correlated to product market risk in the form of demand uncer-
tainty, which together with downstream risk aversion enables





= µ = w∗ − c = 0.) Put differently, product
market risk may limit the value of vertical integration as a tool
to combat the opportunism problem, which is consistent with the
data.
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